Just over a century ago, Canadian soldiers served in a war being fought on a continent thousands of miles away and for reasons that had nothing to do with Canada itself. In total, almost 8,000 Canadian volunteers sailed to South Africa to fight alongside the British in the Boer War of 1899 to 1902. Fearful that such an obvious imperialistic venture might divide the nation, prime minister Wilfrid Laurier assured the House of Commons that his Liberal government’s support for the volunteer brigades did not construe “a precedent for future action.” Rubbish, responded French-Canadian MP Henri Bourassa: “The precedent is the accomplished fact.”

A century later, Canada is once more committed to a faraway conflict in which it has no direct interest. Last week, Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper reaffirmed the country’s commitment, pledging that Canadian troops would remain in Kandahar province until at least 2011. In return, Canada’s NATO allies agreed to contribute a further 1,000 troops plus additional equipment. “That doesn’t mean that I don’t expect at a later date they [NATO] may not come and ask for some kind of extension,” Harper said when asked if 2011 was an absolute deadline. “But I think they understand that we’re serious.”

And so, once again, it’s open to debate whether Canada’s current commitment to Afghanistan is free of any future obligation, or whether the open-ended nature of its commitment is now an “accomplished fact.” It’s been four years since U.S. President George W. Bush declared success in Afghanistan as “the first victory in the war on terror,” but with hindsight (or even without) perhaps this was premature. Hamid Karzai, newly appointed leader of the interim government that replaced the Taliban, was more cautious, acknowledging that “this fight against the remnants of terrorism will go on for some time.”

Yet unlike Laurier, Harper has shown little concern that Canada’s ongoing involvement in Afghanistan may divide the country. Within the House of Commons, this is understandable. Neither the Bloc Québécois — the spiritual descendants of Bourassa — nor the NDP, both principled in their opposition to the war, is in a position to bring down the Conservative government over this issue.

Only the Liberals can do that, and Stéphan Dion’s party is handicapped in two major ways. First, it was the Liberal party itself, under prime minister Jean Chrétien, that committed Canada to intervention in Afghanistan back in 2001, and as such can hardly criticize the mission’s underlying purpose or objectives. Second, the Liberals have repeatedly declined to defeat the government on votes of confidence, Harper having effectively called Dion’s bluff on a variety of issues. There’s little chance that Canada’s role in Afghanistan is any more likely to precipitate a sudden election.

Harper says this is because opposition parties have “misread Canadian public opinion,” which largely remains supportive of the mission. “Canadian public opinion is upset by casualties,” Harper conceded last week, “but I don’t think [it]… thinks supporting the Karzai government and its efforts to rebuild Afghanistan against the Taliban is a bad thing.”

He may or may not be right in this assessment, but the main reason why Afghanistan fails to excite or mobilize mass opposition is due to the nature of the conflict itself. Now in its seventh year, Canada’s mission in Afghanistan is already Canada’s longest military operation in history. The current war may still make the headlines, but public reaction has largely been dulled by the passage of time and numbed by a sense of familiarity. In short, much as in George Orwell’s vision of 1984, the war is simply the backdrop for our everyday lives.

Had the toll of casualties been higher, of course, then the story might have been different. As of last week, the number of Canadian soldiers killed in action since 2001 was just 82. For perspective, this figure should be contrasted to 61,000 killed during the First World War, 42,000 in the Second World War, and even 300 in the Korean War.

Those conflicts, of course, involved far greater numbers of Canadian troops, but even allowing for that, the fact remains that the present mission has produced a far lower rate of casualty. For example, in the First World War, nearly one soldier in 10 was killed in combat. In Korea, it was one in 83. Since the mission in Afghanistan began, however, the casualty rate among Canadian soldiers has been one in 183. Or to put it another way, while Canadians have been killed in Afghanistan at the rate of approximately one per month, during the four years of the First World War, the average monthly total was over 1,200.

Any public debate on the current mission can hardly turn on its cost in terms of casualties, then. There may well be those who would argue that any fatality is one too many, but in that case Canada probably shouldn’t be in the business of military intervention in the first place.

More realistically, the mission should be judged in terms of its original aims and the likelihood of achieving them. At the outset in 2001, the Liberal government identified three main goals: To defend Canada’s national interests, to ensure Canada’s leadership in world affairs and to help Afghanistan rebuild. Harper’s comments to NATO last week seemed to imply that the first two goals had been met. Canada’s commitment to stay until 2011 was to ensure the fulfilment of the third goal, i.e. to strengthen the Afghan police force, train its military, build bridges and pave roads.

Harper also said that the building of a “secure” Afghanistan could take as long as 20 to 25 years. If so, then it’s unlikely that Canada could simply walk away in 2011, whatever the state of affairs at that time. After all, the “accomplished fact” of its commitment to Afghanistan is ample precedent for more of the same.