| Sprawl. The very word itself seems to spread outward. Maybe it’s the width of the "w," and lack of sharpness that a "t" or "d" at the end of the word would provide. The lazy "l" – especially in upper case – points outward, and phonetically stretches toward the horizon.
Of course, the word "sprawl" has become entrenched in conventional wisdom about urban thinking as one of the most negative, pejorative, even downright evil descriptions to some in the entire lexicon about modern cities. "Sprawl" is shorthand for a whole constellation of perceived ills – land consumption, long commutes in gas-guzzling SUVs (and therefore global warming), big-box retail and the commensurate demise of downtown or neighbourhood retail, and even obesity.
But maybe it’s not that simple. In much the same way that the book Freakonomics challenges conventional wisdom about economics, a new book by Robert Bruegmann tries to challenge conventional wisdom about urban form. Cleverly titled, Sprawl: A Compact History tries to deconstruct a number of the assumptions behind contemporary discourse around the subject. Bruegmann has all the right credentials to ensure he can’t be dismissed out of hand as a crackpot. He teaches art history, architecture and urban planning at the University of Illinois at Chicago.
Bruegmann categorizes the criticisms of sprawl into four basic assumptions – that it is economically inefficient, environmentally damaging, socially inequitable and esthetically ugly. The economic argument is that sprawl requires a lot of infrastructure – roads, sewers and the like – which imposes a huge financial burden on municipalities and their taxpayers. Bruegmann’s position is that these costs are not really that high compared with the overall cost of government. He also argues that the costs are borne by the developers and purchasers of new houses, and makes the libertarian, laissez-faire, "market-driven" argument that if this is what people want, what right does anybody have to interfere?
Here in Calgary, there is a debate taking place right now about the question of whether developers and buyers are, in fact, bearing the costs of sprawl. The city has recently proposed a surcharge of $2,500 to $3,500 on homes in new developments precisely to address this question. The developers have responded by arguing that they (and ultimately their customers) already pay about $88,000 per acre in development charges. Frankly, I’m not familiar enough with the numbers nor sufficiently trained in urban economics to be able to say whether the real, long-term costs of development are truly being borne in full by new home developers and buyers, although I suspect they’re not.
Of course, there is the corollary argument that suburbanites use more and more expensive services, but pay the same tax rate as urbanites. So, taking the difference in land value between the inner and outer city into consideration, suburbanites are effectively being subsidized by inner-city dwellers. Bruegmann says this may well be true, and that the solution is to change the rate structure. Again, this is an ongoing issue in Calgary. There have been complaints from inner-city residents and their representatives on city council, but I have heard nothing to suggest that changing the actual rate structure is getting any serious consideration.
On the environmental argument, Bruegmann sidesteps the land consumption question, arguing instead about density. He suggests that a "dense" city, with tall buildings relying on big centralized energy systems, is actually inefficient. As a hypothetical contrast, he suggests that a world in which we all lived at two-acre densities and generated all of our own energy needs on site, with geothermal, wind and solar power, would be more efficient. Perhaps, but this is an utterly unrealistic rhetorical flourish and completely dodges the question of consuming land – be it agricultural or habitat for native species.
On the social inequity problem, Bruegmann’s argument is more difficult to refute. He quite correctly points out that there is as much – or more – social inequity in cities with growth boundaries or "smart growth" policies as there is in those with massive sprawl. He makes a strong argument that the issue of redistributing wealth should not be confused with one of urban form or physical arrangement. Social inequity and redistributing wealth are political and social problems, and Urbanism (Old or New) has a demonstrably poor track record in trying to solve that problem simply through urban form.
Finally, on the esthetic issue, he argues that the categorization of sprawl as "ugly" is a simplistic and elitist position. Again, he makes the "market-driven" argument, asking, "If sprawl is so ugly, why do so many people buy those houses?" Here, he sidesteps matters of economics (suburban houses are, at least in the short term, less expensive) and marketing (suburban developments are aggressively marketed with appeals to powerful emotional sentiments about "home").
Bruegmann argues that sprawl is neither a recent or exclusively North American "problem." He points to the country villas of ancient Rome and country estates of 17th and 18th century England, and argues that the desire to get out of the crowded, dirty city has been with us as long as cities have. Ultimately, he proposes that the issue is really one of affordability – that the ability to do just that has only recently become a viable alternative for middle- and lower-income people (and that the technologies of transportation – cars, buses, streetcars, trains and subways – has made the suburbs more accessible at the same time.)
In other words, Bruegmann argues that modern "sprawl" is democratic – that it has made a "villa in the countryside" something accessible not only to the upper classes, but to virtually everyone. By staking a claim to "democracy," Bruegmann’s argument attempts to put the critic of sprawl in a difficult position – either "anti-democratic" (and therefore authoritarian) or elitist.
He also cleverly argues that our perception of European cities as wonderfully dense and free of sprawl is based purely on our tourist experiences, based on our perceptions of those cities on short-term visits to their urban cores. But Bruegmann points out that Paris, Milan, Barcelona and London have tremendous sprawl that we just don’t see, and therefore don’t acknowledge.
The importance of Bruegmann’s book is that it challenges the fundamental assumptions that "sprawl" is a recent and uniquely North American problem, "caused" by the car, zoning regulations or any of the other "usual suspects." If sprawl is a long-term and global "problem," then perhaps stopping it involves something other than correcting "poor" North American land-use policies.
Bruegmann’s book is unconvincing on many points and unfairly tries to cast criticism of sprawl as elitist, but it does make abundantly clear that sprawl, like the word itself, is long and drawn out, and not just a problem facing the contemporary North American city. It hasn’t changed my mind that sprawl is a problem to be addressed, but it has succeeded in reframing the question. If we’re going to find solutions to sprawl, we need to be asking the right questions, and questioning the assumptions each of us holds to be self-evident. |
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