| Unfortunately, the euphoria of free elections in Iraq for the first time in more than 50 years is already changing to despair for a large number of people.
The results of the election were announced more than a month ago, but the problem facing Iraq today is that the Provisional Constitution (enacted by the Americans) requires the winning block to secure the support of two-thirds of the elected assembly before it can form a government.
The United Iraqi Alliance (UIA), endorsed by the Shiite religious establishment, won more than half the seats in the forthcoming assembly (148 out of 275), however, this is not enough to form a government that requires the support of 183 members. Apart from the list of the interim prime minister, who won 40 seats, the Kurds, with 75 seats, could be a suitable partner, but their demands for joining a coalition with the UIA create a stumbling block. The Kurds want concessions that, according to the UIA negotiators, only the National Assembly is authorized to discuss and enact into law.
Demographically, Iraq is a varied country. In addition to the majority Arabs, there are substantial minorities, of which the Kurds (who are non-Arab Sunni Muslims) in the north of the country are the largest. In addition to ethnic differences, there are also many religions. Arab Muslims themselves are divided into Shiites and Sunnis. Apart from some ethnic Kurds, no group has entertained a separate existence from the state of Iraq. The Sunni Arabs boycotted the elections and supported the insurgency, but they are not demanding separation.
As the Kurdish political parties are staunch supporters of the U.S., a great number of people think the U.S. is ultimately responsible for the present impasse in the political process in Iraq. They believe that the Americans do not want the Shiites to play an effective role in Iraq, just as the British before them marginalized the Shiites in favour of the Sunnis.
Historically, when the British invaded Iraq during the First World War, the Shiite Muslims resisted, along with the Ottoman Turkish army. To punish the Shiites, the British gave the reins of power in the "new" Iraq, created in 1921, to the minority Sunni Muslims. In an attempt to increase the number of Sunnis, the British revoked their promise to establish a Kurdish state in the north of Iraq and appended the Kurdish area to modern Iraq. The Kurds have never acquiesced in their status as an integral part of Iraq – they have been in almost constant rebellion.
The regime of Saddam Hussein represented the "climax" of Sunni Arab rule and the almost total marginalization of the Shiite Arabs. During the brutal war with Iran, which lasted eight gruesome years, Saddam was considered an ally of the United States. Only after the invasion of Kuwait did Saddam become a pariah.
But when the Shiites rose against Saddam after former U.S. president George H. Bush publicly called on the Iraqi people and army to rise and depose the government of "the dictator," Bush did not support their uprising. According to statistics confirmed by the United Nations, at least 300,000 Shiites were killed on orders from Saddam’s commanders and buried in mass graves (Prime Minister Tony Blair, November 20, 2003, and Human Rights Watch, May, 2004).
Forcing the regime to abandon the area and then imposing a no-fly zone protected the Kurds in the north. The Shiites were not so lucky. Saddam was allowed a free hand to crush any Shiite dissension. To explain why the U.S. withheld its support for the rebels, Thomas Friedman, foreign affairs columnist for the New York Times, put it as follows: "The U.S. remains committed – as apparently it still is – to the Bush administration policy that preferred ‘an iron-fisted Iraqi junta,’ without Saddam Hussein, a return to the days when Saddam's ‘iron fist... held Iraq together,’ much to the satisfaction of the American allies Turkey and Saudi Arabia, not to speak of Washington." (New York Times, July 1991.)
The Sunni minority, which constituted the bulwark of Saddam’s support, had again been reassured that the basic structure of power, which puts them at the helm, remains intact with the Americans, as it had been with the British.
When the U.S., helped by Britain, invaded Iraq in March 2003, the Shiites followed what they called "positive neutrality" as they did not want to defend the regime of their tormentors. The Sunnis, thinking that the U.S. would only topple Saddam and then keep their hegemony over Iraq untouched, deserted Saddam and waited for the U.S. to call them back to accede to power again. Only the Kurds actively supported the U.S. forces after they became certain that the U.S. was serious about toppling Saddam Hussein.
When President George W. Bush declared that the main reason for the U.S. invasion was to bring democracy to Iraq, the Shiites, including their highest spiritual leader, seized on this promise and demanded that the U.S. implement it as soon as possible. The U.S. hesitated at first, but the Shiites insisted on direct voting. The U.S. then relented and eventually insisted on holding the elections. Many people thought the Americans believed their man, Ayad Allawi, an ex-Baathist, would win the elections.
On the other hand, when the Sunnis realized that the Americans were hesitating in giving them back the reins of power, they openly advocated the support of a rebellion instigated by the remnants of Saddam’s Baath Party, which embraced foreign Wahhabi elements. They started a campaign of terror against Shiites, including suicide bombings of mosques, processions and other gatherings. The Sunnis tried strenuously to cancel or postpone the elections.
At the moment, the inability of the UIA to come to an agreement with the Kurds and satisfy the terms of the "American" Provisional Constitution is the main reason for the delay in convening the National Assembly (it was tentatively scheduled to meet March 16) and forming a government. Interestingly, this delay has encouraged the interim prime minister, America’s top ally, who obtained only 14 per cent of the vote, to put his name forward as a candidate for prime minister in the new government.
All these events feed the existing suspicions about America’s intentions in forming the new Iraq. People now ask whether America will eventually do as it planned in 1991 – preserve Saddam’s regime, but with a new face. The majority of Iraqis, however, would like to believe that the U.S. is genuine about its intentions to allow democracy to flourish first in Iraq and then in the rest of the Middle East. Already the Iraqi elections are having a positive effect in many Arab countries, and this will be more pronounced once there is a working government in Iraq based on the results of the popular vote in January.
If the U.S. ever aborts this budding experiment of democracy in Iraq, it will be one of the biggest losers. Not only will its credibility suffer irreparably, but the terrorist organizations will be given the recruiting tool they have been dreaming about for a long time.
Munaf Yassiri is an Iraq-born engineer and a member of Calgary’s peace movement. He is currently writing a book about Iraq. |
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