| So, this is it. The "new world order" that George Bush Senior boasted of more than a decade ago has finally been delivered by Junior.
Backed by a hastily assembled "Gang of 35," and over the impotent protests of the United Nations, the U.S. has achieved its stated aim of ousting Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein. Better still, in a moment of Freudian overachievement, the son outshone the father by storming the gates of Baghdad.
All that lies ahead now is the task of rebuilding a liberal, democratic and pro-capitalist Iraq. Easy.
Well, maybe not. Once the smoke clears and the POWs are all returned, some serious questions remain. What really matters now is how President Bush responds to them. Here are just three problems for him to consider: 1. Now that Iraq’s been dealt with, who’s next? 2. What will the much-discussed "interim government" actually look like? 3. What is the next move for the Middle East?
Definitive answers to any of these questions are unlikely to emerge in the weeks or even months ahead. Still, they are questions the U.S. administration needs to address sooner rather than later if it is to justify the unilateral action taken against Iraq.
First, who will the U.S. target next? After all, Iraq was but one member of the "Axis of Evil," and it is fair to assume that America will follow through on its threat and turn to Iran and/or North Korea. Three times the size and with three times the population of Iraq, Iran poses considerable logistical problems to any invading force, although a "neutralized" Iraq should prove a useful base of operations for the U.S.
But North Korea poses an even greater problem. Possessing nuclear weapons and a viable delivery system, it’s doubtful that the regime of Kim Jong Il will just sit back and watch America invade it for the second time in 50 years. And outside of Japan, willing allies in that part of the world will be hard for the U.S. to find. Nevertheless, having set itself the righteous goal of ridding the world of brutal dictators, it’s difficult to see how the U.S. can easily back away from further unilateral action.
Second, how is the transition from dictatorship to democracy to be managed in Iraq? Despite all the talk about delivering power to the "Iraqi people," it should be noted that Iraq remains a bitterly divided nation. Carved out of the old Ottoman Empire at the end of the First World War, modern Iraq is split between Shi’ite and Sunni Muslims, between Muslims and non-Muslims, and between those for and against increased "westernization." It also contains a Kurdish population seeking independence. The idea that democracy will automatically reconcile these divisions needs to be discarded right away. Current scenes of looting in the streets of Baghdad are but a gentle taste of the civil strife to come.
Third, how will Iraq’s neighbours in the Middle East respond to this war and its outcome? A recent editorial in the Economist ruled out the likelihood of either a pan-Arab reaction or a turn to violent Islamism, yet it seems equally unlikely that other Arab nations will simply shrug off the invasion of Iraq. What’s more probable is that they will view that country’s "liberation" in the context of the past century’s events.
During the First World War, Britain made promises of independence to the region’s Arabs if they agreed to revolt against their Turkish overlords, then allied to Germany. At the same time, promises of a Jewish homeland in Palestine were also made. As it turned out, Britain reneged on both promises, conveniently ignoring the 1919 Versailles Treaty’s commitment to the idea of national self-determination for all peoples. Instead, along with the French, it carved up the Middle East into a series of "mandates." This, Britain assured the world, would allow the western powers to administer the region "for the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants." To that end, British troops occupied Palestine, modern-day Jordan and Iraq, while France took over Syria and Lebanon.
Ultimately, of course, the Arab world resisted this western occupation. In the crisis of 1956, British and French troops invaded Egypt following President Nasser’s seizure of the Suez Canal. On that occasion, the western coalition won the war, but they also outraged international opinion in the process. Eventually, Canada’s Lester B. Pearson would lead the UN to intervene and establish the idea of peacekeeping.
Almost 50 years later, another western invasion has taken place, this time led by the world’s largest – indeed, only – imperial power and in spite of UN protests. Beyond a few well-publicized shots of toppling statues and cheering crowds, however, there’s no evidence that either Iraqis themselves or any of their Arab neighbours would welcome a prolonged presence of U.S. force in the Middle East.
So the final question for now, it seems, is just when, how and on what terms does the U.S. extricate itself from its present position? To listen to Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld, it’s easy to assume that this is a decision for the U.S. alone to make. In the weeks ahead, events will probably prove otherwise.
Where then the UN? |
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