| In late September 1938, British prime minister Neville Chamberlain returned from Munich to declare that he had secured "peace in our time." The British-French acceptance of Adolf Hitler’s "limited" claims to the Czech Sudetenland – a border region inhabited largely by Germans – had, he argued, averted a war.
Six months later, German troops marched into Czechoslovakia anyway, bringing to an end the republic’s independent existence. The same fate awaited neighbouring Poland in the summer of ’39, but this time Britain stood firm in its resolve to avoid another "Munich." And so, two days after the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, Chamberlain declared the very war that his policy of "appeasement" had failed to prevent.
I’ve been hearing the "a" word a lot in recent weeks. Protestors who march in opposition to the proposed war against Iraq quickly find themselves labeled "appeasers." Political commentators and historians warn us that appeasement of dictators "never works" – it only encourages them. And all the time, the working definition of "appeasement" continues to widen, now including those simply doing their jobs (e.g. UN weapons inspector Hans Blix) or anyone daring to offer an alternative to war (e.g. French President Jacques Chirac).
This "broad brush" tactic makes sense, of course – ever since Munich, it’s been impossible to offer a defence of appeasement. And current thinking within the White House seems to have further reduced all discussion of options to a simple equation: anti-war equals pro-appeasement equals pro-Saddam Hussein. Yet it’s one thing to hold, as an article of faith, that "appeasement never works," and quite another to understand why, in specific circumstances, sane men of good faith have pursued "appeasement" as a reasonable course of action.
So, back to Britain and 1938. What motivated Chamberlain to opt for appeasement in the face of all the evidence about Hitler’s intentions? Discounting the various "pro-Nazi" conspiracy theories that, from time to time, cast a shadow over British motives, there are three serious schools of thought on the subject.
First, the "liberal" or "moralist" view of international relations. According to this, the 1919 Versailles Treaty punished Germany too harshly for "starting" the First World War. Some redress was in order, and so perhaps Hitler’s claim to the Sudetenland – in the name of "national self-determination" – was just, after all.
Second, the "traditionalist" view. This argues that Chamberlain and his ministers – with the notable exception of Winston Churchill – remained rooted in 19th century conceptions of statesmanship. Consequently, they failed to understand the sheer modernity of fascist leaders like Hitler. Quaint notions such as "my word is my bond" and even signed agreements meant nothing to Hitler. The British and the Germans weren’t simply playing by different rules, they were playing different games. Hitler knew this; Chamberlain didn’t.
Finally, the "realist" school of thought. Contrary to the "traditionalists," this maintains that the British did indeed appreciate the very real danger that Hitler presented in the spring of 1938, but also knew they were in no shape to fight an all-out war. The sacrifice of Czechoslovakia was therefore necessary in order to buy more time in which to prepare their armed forces and – just as importantly – ready the domestic public for the coming conflict.
Debate over which of these views is correct continues to this day. In What If? Eminent Historians Imagine What Might Have Been, U.S. historian Williamson Murray considers what would have happened had Britain gone to war over Czechoslovakia in 1938. His conclusion: an early war would, in fact, have been to Hitler’s disadvantage, perhaps decisively so.
But that’s a luxury of hindsight. More significant is the fact that none of these three schools of thought roots appeasement in either abject cowardice or principled opposition to war itself. Instead, they all agree that it was a policy that, however flawed, was based on an understanding of the world as it was perceived at the time.
And so back to today. As the U.S. prepares for its war against Iraq, Bush and his supporters draw justification from appeasement’s "failure" in the 1930s. After all, if appeasing Hitler didn’t work, then neither will appeasing Hussein. The only other option is war.
At best, this strikes me as the logic of kindergarten, in which the world is starkly divided into good/bad, right/wrong, etc. Accordingly, the U.S. asks – no, demands – that everyone line up and pick a side. At worst, it’s a return to the Orwellian nightmare of 1984, in which the only way to "save" the Iraqi people, it seems, is to complete the job of bombing them into oblivion that George Bush Sr. began a decade ago. And those who oppose such violence are, and can only be, in favour of maintaining the current dictatorship and all it stands for.
This simplistic perception of the world, loosely based on "lessons" of the 1930s, is no basis for understanding the complexities of post-cold war realities. There are at least three reasons why.
First, this is not the 1930s. Despite U.S. opposition and obstruction over the years, the UN has established itself as a viable mediator, and one that should be allowed to do its job of preventing – not directing – international war. The U.S. might not like the reports of Blix and others, but then it should quit the UN and designate itself as a "rogue state."
Second, given its vast military superiority, the U.S. should win the next war against Iraq in about three days. But then, 10 years down the road, someone is going to detonate a nuclear device in Manhattan and Americans will still ask "Why?" September 11 was a wake-up call: the very nature of war has changed, with the concepts of "winning" and "losing" far less clear than in, say, 1945.
Finally, for once I agree with Prime Minister Jean Chrétien. The U.S.’s stated goal of ousting Hussein, regardless of whether he disarms, is untenable. As Chrétien asked recently, "When are we going to go elsewhere? Who’s going to be next?" The list of dictators remains long and challenging.
In short, if you make a good/bad division of the world the basis of your foreign policy, you’re going to be mighty busy enforcing it. "Appeasement" might not be the answer to problems like Iraq, but if not, then let’s have a clearer question. |
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