FFWD Weekly
Copyright © 1998 All Rights Reserved.
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| VIEWPOINT Indonesia's dictator of 32 years, President Suharto, is gone. The end for this strongman came quickly and without bloodshed. No one believed he could solve Indonesia's economic crisis so he was tossed aside. Now his short-term successor, B. J. Habibie, and whatever government succeeds him must try and solve the problems that caused hundreds of frustrated, poor Indonesians to riot and loot their way through Jakarta three weeks ago. Habibie was put in place by a military that does not like him. Already, the army and the elite are trying to come up with a new political system to appease their people and the world. The biggest problem facing Indonesia's leaders is the growing despair about the state of the economy, and the gap between the rich and the poor. The gap is represented in the dual nature of the events leading up to Suharto's resignation. University students across the country protested against Suharto for months, but the protests had little impact. The rioters and looters that made the news across the world were taking everything they could lay their hands on, and trying to hurt those who had made money during the economic boom. These are the people that scared the military into asking for Suharto's resignation. These are the people that Indonesia's current and future governments must worry about. If the poor begin to believe that they do not have a hope of ever crossing the gap, Indonesia's future will be one of violence. The upheaval will strengthen the military's position in the government - not that it was ever weak - because no matter how Indonesians choose their governments, they will want the military to control the rage and keep the poor in line. The reason for the riots lies in four per cent of the population controlling approximately 70 per cent of the wealth, but the trigger came in the form of last month's sudden 50- to 100-per-cent price increases for food and gas. The price increases were forced on Indonesia as one of the conditions of the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) $43 billion life-support program for Indonesia's currency, the rupiah. All IMF bail-outs come with strings attached. As part of the IMF's missionary work for the free market, countries taking money from the IMF must open up their borders so that companies from the countries that support IMF can compete with local manufacturers. For Indonesia, opening up the borders meant removing the subsidies Suharto had put on a lot of items, including gas, to protect Indonesians from the rupiah's free-fall. Despite the price increases and riots, Indonesia is in danger of losing the $43-billion bail-out. The IMF has suspended payments because other economic changes were not fast enough and, in a new branch of missionary work, political changes requested by the IMP were not happening either. Another variable in the situation is the sovereignty ambitions of conquered East Timor, and the provinces of Irian Jaya and Aceh. These areas have been quiet of late, but if the turmoil on the main island continues, you can expect the rebel groups in each of these areas to take advantage of the situation. The Indonesian government, a little short on experienced reformers, is faced with bringing in political and economic restructuring as soon as possible. On the political side, it must create protected freedoms for the press and political parties, open and fair elections, changes in the makeup of its legislature, and limited terms for presidents. On the economic side, it must create a working bank system, put an end to the Suhartos' leech-like grasp on various national interests and privatize them, deal with a failed rice crop, cope with another record forest fire season, and keep as many poor employed and happy as possible. No wonder Suharto is taking his $16 billion and getting the hell out. |
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